Holdem Poker Hands

But those were no more likely than something like QT, A4, or 33. In fact, they were less likely. And he would just as readily bet with a hand like:

Against Pierre I had to consider that:

Queen-high might be the best poker hand on the flop.
If queen-high was not best, pairing either of my cards would give me a reasonable chance of winning.
I had a backdoor straight draw which could give me an open ended or gut shot draw on the turn.
I had the second but backdoor flush draw.
If I hit either of these draws on the turn, the high likelihood that Pierre was bluffing would increase my chance of winning the pot on a semi-bluff as a resteal.

These factors dictated that I not fold. If I too often folded in a spot like this against Pierre, I would be giving up too much.

Moreover, he would interpret my passivity as a license to steal from me every chance he got. No, folding was not the play here (though it could be at some other time). The choice was either raise or call. Before I go on, let me note that having played similar hands before, I knew quickly on this flop what I was going to do. I did not need to spend time analyzing each option. Here I present a detailed analysis simply to show you the logic behind the play. Returning to the hand, though a raise was not out of the question, it would border on being a pure bluff at that point in the hand.

I had no outs that would give me a very strong hand, much less a sure winner on the turn. Moreover, the small flop bet would hardly give Pierre pause if he had any hope whatsoever of winning.

He would be unimpressed by a raise on the cheap betting round, and would call, almost forcing me to bet again on the turn, extending my bluff over two rounds. This did not provide the kind of leverage I was looking for. On the other hand, calling now on the chance of picking up either a pair, or one of my draws on the turn would give me the opportunity to semi-bluff when Pierre would take it more seriously and I would have outs that would likely win if they hit. (Cards that would accomplish this were any queen, jack, ten, nine, ace, or heart, for a total of 23 cards). I knew as well that Pierre might opt not to bet again on the turn. So I might also have the option of taking a free card. I therefore called his bet on the flop.

The turn brought perhaps the best possible draw –creating card for me- the ten of hearts. I now had both a straight draw and a flush draw for 15 outs. (Of course there was some chance Pierre bet again and I raised. Pierre thought for several moments and called. His call could mean that he held a heart, a nine, a pair, or even just ace-high. The reason he was a frequent bluffer, and therefore may have been aware that I might try to resteal from him with a semi-bluff. Well, I missed.

The river was the K♠. The board now read:

Pierre hesitated for a moment and bet. Did he have a king? I doubled it. He had paused too long to think on the turn. Pierre was a player who would have called almost automatically with a king or better. (*this is why you should sometimes pretend to think even when you have nothing to think about). Moreover, with only trips now he would not be too likely to bet into me after I had so strongly represented a flush or straight. No, I put him not on a hand, but on a “move”. His play was most consistent with a complete bust, a weak pair such as A7, or perhaps an ace-high hand with which he was trying to steal the pot using the paired king as a scare card. He probably hoped that I held a busted draw (as I did), and would not consider raising, or simply that the threat of trips would force me to fold a weaker hand. The problem for me was the possible one pair and ace-high hands he could hold.

I could not call in the hope of winning with my queen because those represented a large portion of the hands he could have, especially in light of his having stayed with the hand till the river. With the high likelihood that he had very little, but just enough to beat me, it was clear that my best play was to resteal from him. I was sure my image with Pierre was at least fairly tight, and he would have a hard time not respecting a raise from me. He may have been skeptical that I held a big hand when I raised on the turn. But it had been consistent with a made hand, and a second raise now would go a long way toward erasing any skepticism. I did raise, he though a couple of moments, and folded. I must stress again that given only slightly different circumstances a good case could have been made for a different action on my part at nearly any point in the hand. Had I not been slightly concerned about how Pierre was viewing my raises, for example, I might have reraised preflop.

Had Pierre been a less aggressive, less frequent bluffer, I might have folded on the flop. The turn decision was routine, but calling instead of raising could have been an option under certain conditions. Finally, the raise on the river could easily have been wrong had I not been up against a player whose aggressiveness and bluffing frequency greatly reduced the chance that he held a hand with which he could (or would) call. Poker decisions tend to be situational in nature. They depend very much on the specific circumstances of the hand. Never is this more much on the specific circumstances of the hand. Never is this more true than in short-handed play. In short-handed play. In short-handed games decisions are strongly influenced by how you think your opponents are seeing your play, how you want to affect their opponent’s emotional states, how you interpret subtle nonverbal cues, and more.

Moreover, quick thinking is a plus as you are often faced with new, unanticipated options on successive betting rounds. Notice, for instance, in the hand I played, that I had not expected a bet from my opponent on the river and had to decide relatively quickly how to deal with it. The combination of the call on the flop, the semi-bluff raise on the turn, and the bluff-raise on the river made this hand a bit “extreme”, a hand play“out on the edge” relative to more typical hands. Such hands come up sometimes in short-handed play, more often than they do in ring games. They highlight the thought processes of poker and the situational nature of play. It follows that short-handed play can help sharpen your thinking for ring games where most of your play need not push the limits so hard. For more on playing short-handed see the essay, “Short-Handed Play: Don’t Miss out.”

<< Previous

The Strategic Moment in Holdem / One Way Not to Fold /

Beating the Berserko: Preflop Against a Maniac /

On Into the Storm: Playing the maniac After the Flop

One Reason to Reraise a Maniac / A Simple Read / Countering a Good Reader

Thinking About What They’re Thinking / Out On the Edge

Considerations in Two Blind Stealing Defense situations

Easing the Transition to the middle Limits: Part I

Easing the Transition to the middle Limits: Part II / Multiple Changing Images